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Abstract: In this paper we present some empirical results about absolute and conditional 
convergence of real GDP within 121 countries using cross-country data. We assume that 
there is an inverted U-shaped curve, which describes the relationship between economic 
growth and government spending. It is mainly because the institutional conditions of 
productivity do not exist at lower levels of government spending. At higher levels, the 
government needs to levy higher taxes to finance its expenditures, which hinders growth. 
So there can be somewhere an optimal government redistribution level that maximizes 
growth. This optimal level depends on institutional factors that can be grabbed by certain 
Economic Freedom and Worldwide Governance Indicators. It was not our aim necessarily 
to determine exactly the level of optimal government redistribution, it would be difficult 
because of the heterogeneity of the countries, only to make a comparison between free 
and less free countries, and draw some conclusions about how this level depends on these 
institutional variables. Summing up we can say that our aim was to compare free and less 
free, legally “good” and “bad”, as well as corrupt and less corrupt countries from the aspect 
of government redistribution level. If we divide countries into free and less free countries 
and assume that both groups have an inverted U-shaped curve, the optimal level of 
government spending share is larger in the richer countries because of their better 
institutional system. These results do not contradict those findings that declare positive or 
negative relationship between government spending and economic growth. One part of the 
literature presumes that there is only one optimal level of government spending, we point 
out that there can be at least two optimal levels, and they depend on the institutional 
quality. 
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1. Introduction 
Various authors have examined the relationship between government size and economic 
growth. Some of the researchers found a positive link, like Myrdal (1960) and Easterlin 
(1974), but some of them found it negative, for example Rubinson (1977), Cameron 
(1982), Landau (1983) and Marlow (1986). The most recent ones also found it negative, 
like Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008), Afonso and Furceri (2010) among many other 
authors. They used mainly cross-country and panel data to illustrate it. All in all, there is no 
general convincing empirical evidence about the sign of this relationship, but some other 
variables will help to understand the problem. 
A naive conclusion from the general framework of Solow (1956) model leads to the finding 
that poorer countries are growing with a faster speed than the richer ones because of the 
decreasing marginal product of capital. So theoretically, poorer countries can catch up 
(Solow, 1956, 1957).   
On the contrary, according to Barro (1990), we know that there is no absolute convergence 
within the countries of the world. Absolute convergence occurs only within more 
homogeneous groups like European Union or Europe and Asia together. African countries 
for example seem to lag behind and it is mainly due to institutional differences. If the less 
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developed countries had the same institution quality, they would be able to converge to the 
developed countries. Summing up, absolute convergence is not true due to institutional 
differences, but there can be a conditional convergence. If the government spending is 
near the optimal level in a given country, this country can grow faster. As we mentioned, 
too high and too low redistribution hinders growth. We assume that richer economies have 
a higher optimal level, and the institutionally underdeveloped countries have a lower 
optimal government size. According to Tanzi (2005) the optimal level of government 
spending is 30 percent. We do not suppose that there is only one optimal level. We 
assume that there is at least two optimal levels, and it depends on institutional variables. 
These variables are measured by Economic Freedom, Legal System & Property Rights, 
and Control of Corruption.  
In Chapter 2 we examine 121 countries. Most of the data come from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI, 2014). At first we provide some descriptive statistics to 
ascertain whether it is an absolute convergence among all of the countries, than we 
divided the sample into groups according to the abovementioned there institutional 
variables: Economic Freedom, Legal System and Property Rights, and finally Control of 
Corruption. If freer economies are richer, but grow slower than the others, less free ones 
can catch up. We will see that it is not true. 
Freer countries are much wealthier and grow faster at the same time, so less developed 
countries do have a chance under these circumstances to approach them. The result is 
similar in the other two situations. So one dividing variable is enough to run regressions. In 
Chapter 3 we run three regression, the first is for all countries, but these countries are very 
heterogeneous, so the fit is not so good. After that we run the same on only the free 
countries, than only on less free countries. Of course, we know that freer economies are 
also wealthier, and have better legal institutions. According to our results freer countries 
have a higher optimal government redistribution level than less free, less developed, so 
those countries that have worse legal system. 
 
 
2. Variables, sample and data 
In the next Chapter, from the tables we can see three categorizations of 121 countries. We 
examined an 18-year period between 1995 and 2012. We took into account the initial real 
GDP per capita RGDP1995, the average real growth rate of the period, indicated by grr, 
and the structure of government spending. Gtot variable means the total government 
spending as a percentage of GDP. This expense means cash payments for operating 
activities of the government in providing goods and services. It includes compensat ion of 
employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, 
and other expenses such as rents and dividends (WDI, 2014). Gcon variable means the 
government consumption also as a percentage of GDP, more exactly the final government 
expenditure including all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services and compensation of employees (WDI, 2014). Ghea, Gedu and Gmil variables 
simply mean the government expenditure spent on Health, Education and Military as a 
percentage of government expenditure.  
I also used some important variables to divide the data into two groups: The Economic 
Freedom of the World Index, indicated by EFW (EFW, 2012), Legal System & Property 
Rights, indicated by Legal (EFW, 2012), which is a component of Economic Freedom, and 
finally the Control of Corruption, indicated by CC, also in 2012, which is a very important 
component of The Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI 2014).  
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3. Descriptive statistics 
Let’s see at first some descriptive statistics by dividing the sample into groups. The first 
categorization is according to Economic Freedom of the World Index, which is annually 
published by the Canadian Fraser Institute. Table 1 shows that there are 64 units in the 
sample, where EFW>7, and 57, where EFW<7. Countries above 7 are supposed to be 
free, below 7 are less free. We can see from Table 1 that free economies had more than 
five times larger real GDP in 1995, and since then free economies are growing with faster 
pace than the others. So less free countries will never catch up, because their institutional 
system does not allow growing more rapidly. Free countries have larger government 
redistribution, because they are richer and they can afford it. According to Wagner’s law, 
the demand on public goods is growing in the developed countries (Ram, 1987). If we 
carefully examine the differences in the structure of the expenditures, we can see that 
money spent on health is larger, but spent on education and military are lower in the 
developed countries than in the less developed ones on the percentage of total 
government expenditures.  
  
Table 1: Divergence among free and less free countries 
  EFW N Mean Std. Error Mean 
RGDP1995 >= 7,00 64 14747,84 1892,79 
< 7,00 57 2737,82 627,83 
grr >= 7,00 64 2,66 0,21 
< 7,00 57 2,36 0,25 
Gtot >= 7,00 64 29,17 1,45 
< 7,00 57 21,12 1,13 
Gcon >= 7,00 64 16,52 0,64 
< 7,00 57 14,39 0,68 
Ghea >= 7,00 64 12,50 0,44 
< 7,00 57 9,91 0,40 
Gedu >= 7,00 64 13,32 0,43 
< 7,00 57 15,73 0,61 
Gmil >= 7,00 64 8,01 0,85 
< 7,00 57 10,14 0,80 
Source of data: EFW (2014), WDI (2014) 
 
The second division is according to the quality of Legal System & Property Rights (EFW, 
2014). If the quality measure of the legal system and property rights (Legal) is more than 
5.5, the given country is considered to be legally “good”, or if it is under 5.5, we call it 
legally “bad”. We can clearly see from Table 2 that legally “good” countries were more than 
fivefold richer than legally “bad” ones, and the growth rate (grr) was also significantly 
larger, so this difference is continuously increasing. We can also clearly see that legally 
“good” governments spend a larger share of their GDP than the others. Of course we do 
not know the causal relationship, but we can guess that the legally “good” economies are 
also richer, so they can afford to have a bigger redistribution. 
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Table 2: Divergence among legally “good” and “bad” countries 
  Legal N Mean Std. Error Mean 
RGDP1995 >= 5.5 60 15506,13 1968,87 
< 5.5 61 2779,51 625,12 
grr >= 5.5 60 2,76 0,25 
< 5.5 61 2,27 0,21 
Gtot >= 5.5 60 30,38 1,46 
< 5.5 61 20,45 1,04 
Gcon >= 5.5 60 17,57 0,59 
< 5.5 61 13,50 0,64 
Ghea >= 5.5 60 12,31 0,44 
< 5.5 61 10,26 0,44 
Gedu >= 5.5 60 13,84 0,47 
< 5.5 61 15,06 0,59 
Gmil >= 5.5 60 7,96 0,92 
< 5.5 61 10,05 0,73 
Source of data: EFW (2014), WDI (2014) 
 
I also divided the sample into two groups with respect to the control of corruption index 
from 2012. I found that the median value was about at -0.25. The difference is bigger than 
by the earlier two cases. Countries that are less corrupt, had 9 times larger real GDP in 
1995 than the corrupt ones, and the growth rate of these two groups were roughly the 
same, so there is only a slight catch up between these two groups. 
 
Table 3: No significant convergence among “corrupt” and “less corrupt” countries 
  CC N Mean Std. Error Mean 
RGDP1995 >= -.2500 59 16678,46 1950,81 
< -.2500 62 1869,18 324,75 
grr >= -.2500 59 2,44 0,19 
< -.2500 62 2,59 0,26 
Gtot >= -.2500 59 31,52 1,43 
< -.2500 62 19,53 0,92 
Gcon >= -.2500 59 18,48 0,57 
< -.2500 62 12,70 0,54 
Ghea >= -.2500 59 12,18 0,48 
< -.2500 62 10,42 0,41 
Gedu >= -.2500 59 14,08 0,56 
< -.2500 62 14,81 0,52 
Gmil >= -.2500 59 7,29 0,89 
< -.2500 62 10,65 0,74 
 Source of data: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) 
 
 627 
These descriptive statistics do not contain new results, but these findings coincide with 
some of well-known facts (Barro 1990, Czeglédi 2007). It proves that this dataset is 
reliable, so we can run further tests with them. It is clear that every categorization provided 
almost the same result, so hereafter only one variable will be enough to divide the sample.  
 
 
4. Results of the regressions 
As we assumed, there must be an inverted U-shaped relationship between government 
spending and economic growth, because too high and too low government spending does 
not foster growth. So a simple regression model was used, in which we put the Gtot and 
also the square of the Gtot as explaining variables. Our regression model was the 
following: 
 
 
 (1) 
 
This framework is according to Mankiw at al. (1992). We omitted some variables, which 
can cause a little bias, but the order of these levels are good. In this case we can estimate 
the Gtot level that maximizes growth according to the following formula: 
 
 (2) 
 
   
Of course, we know that these estimations are not exact, because there can be some 
omitted variable distortions, we only want to use it in comparing these levels among free 
and less free countries. 
Table 4 shows the coefficients for the whole sample, it contains 121 countries. Of course I 
took the initial lnRGDP1995 as well, where ln means the natural logarithm. Theoretically if 
we get negative coefficient for the Gtot2 and positive for Gtot, it refers to an inverted U-
shape as we assumed, where Gtot2 means the square of variable Gtot. In addition, if we 
get negative coefficient for the initial GDP, it refers to convergence. The optimal value of 
Gtot can be calculated from the coefficients, which maximizes growth. For the whole 
sample, it is 35 percent. Of course we cannot take it seriously, because of the omitted 
variables, but I will use this number only to compare it to the other cases. The Adjusted R 
Square is very low, it means that the model fit leaves much to be desired. We do not want 
to draw conclusions from this case. As we will see later (Table 5 and Table 6), the optimal 
size is 49 percent for the developed countries and 27 for the less developed countries. 
Sadly these numbers are not exact because of the distortions, they do not show 
magnitudes, we can only compare them, for which it is larger. 
 
Table 4: Coefficients of the first regression (Adjusted R Square=0,04) 
 Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error 
 (Constant) 3,898 ,873 4,468 ,000 
lnGDP1995 -,447 ,122 -3,657 ,000 
Gtot ,140 ,053 2,622 ,010 
Gtot2 -,002 ,001 -2,439 ,016 
Source of data: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) 
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Table 5 contains only those countries where the EFW index is larger than 7. As we saw 
from descriptive statistics, these are mainly the richer, the developed countries. We can 
conclude convergence from the coefficient of the initial GDP, and inverted U-shape from 
the Gtot2. The optimal Gtot level would be 49 percent, so bigger than in the others. In this 
case, the Adjusted R Square is very much higher than in the precious case, partly because 
the sample is more heterogeneous.  
 
Table 5: Coefficients of the second regression (Adjusted R Square=0,429) 
Model (EFW>7) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error 
 (Constant) 8,431 1,048 8,044 ,000 
lnGDP1995 -,843 ,137 -6,161 ,000 
Gtot ,098 ,056 1,756 ,084 
Gtot2 -,001 ,001 -1,748 ,085 
Source of data: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) 
 
From Table 6 it is clear that there is also a convergence within less free countries, but here 
the negative coefficient is statistically not significant. Despite this, it seems that there is an 
inverted U-shaped curve. The optimal Gtot level for these probably less developed 
countries that maximizes growth is 27 percent. Of course, this regression result does not 
mean that it is exactly the optimal level, but it is quite sure that lower than in the richer 
economies. According to some researchers, the relationship between growth and 
government size is inverted U-shaped (Tanzi 2005, Armey 1995, Peden 2005, Sheehy 
1995). In all these cases, the coefficient of the Gtot2 is negative, which refers to the 
inverted U-shape. The coefficient of lnGDP1995 is negative for the developed countries, it 
means there is a significant convergence among them. It is a little bit surprising that the 
coefficient of lnGDP1995 is negative for the whole sample, which at first glance seems to 
contradict to Barro (1990), but we must remark that the whole sample is not the whole 
world. Finally, there is no convergence between the less developed countries, because the 
coefficient of lnGDP1995 is not significant, but it seems that there is a U-shape relationship 
between the investigated variables, the coefficient of Gtot2 is even significant. 
 
Table 6: Coefficients of the third regression (Adjusted R Square=0,053) 
Model (EFW<7) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error 
 (Constant) ,477 1,966 ,243 ,809 
lnGDP1995 
-,295 ,223 
-
1,327 
,190 
Gtot ,324 ,143 2,262 ,028 
Gtot2 
-,006 ,003 
-
2,010 
,050 
Source of data: WGI (2014), WDI (2014) 
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5. Concluding remarks 
From the descriptive statistics we can see the well-known fact, that the freer, “legally” 
better and the less corrupt countries are also wealthier. And there is a divergence among 
these countries, but at least does not seem to be any significant convergence between 
them. So it seems that the freer, legally better and less corrupt countries are not only 
richer, but grow faster. But why do the poorer countries lag behind, and do not catch up? 
We can explain it with institutional differences. If the poor countries had the same quality of 
institutional system, they would be able to take the advantage of higher marginal product of 
capital and attract much more investment. But these countries are not so free, the quality 
of legal system is worse, and the corruption is bigger. 
We assumed according to Armey (1995) and Tanzi (2005), that there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between government spending and economic growth. If we take the 
institutional quality into account, we can assume that the developed countries have a U-
shaped curve, and the less developed have another. By the developed countries, the 
government spending level that maximizes growth is larger than by the less developed 
ones. We can see it from Table 5 and Table 6, that free countries have a larger optimal 
level. It was not our aim necessarily to determine the exact level of government spending 
level, this regression method does not make it possible because of the omitted variable 
distortions, but we can conclude that in the free countries the optimal redistribution is 
higher. The government spending share is higher in the developed countries, because they 
have a higher quality of legal system, which is more efficient and enables a higher 
productivity. 
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